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1. IN!'RODUCTION
'lbe suggestion, inspired by some recent La.tin American experiences,

that Third World economies open to international trade and capital nows
are inexorably associated with authoritarian political regimes seems
one that is very odd yet intriguing to one trained in mainstream eco
nomics. The standard training imparted in leading Ph.D.-granting cen
ters provides only a little help in analyzing whatever links there
may

be between openness and authoritarianisr.1, while the less fonnal

tradition which the average graduate student will pick up at those
centers, either by reading selected paragraphs from &nith, P~cardo,
Mills, and even M..arx, or by paradi!?1!la-tic ''corrrnon-sense," actually leads
to an association of closed economies with assorted despotisms.

This

essay is an attempt by someone trained in ma.instream economics to
reflect on some of the various hypotheses, conjectures and insinuations
which have been put forth regarding the link between openness and
\;

authoritarianism, particularly in the La.tin American context.

The

broader topic of connections between economic systems and political
freedom will not be explored; the nature and mainsprings of the
authoritarian state must also be left aside.
Perhaps because of the limited aim of this essay, it is not easy

to find clear statements of revisionist hypotheses and arP,Uments
l1nk1ng open economies with authoritarian regimes.

One line of

reasoning argues that to compete in international markets and to
attract invest~nts, the domestic labour force must be kept cheap and
docile.

Investments with long gestation periods are also said to
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require more predictable political environments; openness ma,y be accan

panied by more of those investments, calling forth authoritarian leaders
eager to supply stability and order.

Another line of reasoning empha

sizes not the steady-state political requirements of openness, but the
political preconditions for a transition from a closed to a roore open
econany.

Such a change, the argument goes, will inevitably hurt vested

interests which can only be disciplined by an authoritarian regime.
Cnce the transition is accomplished, the need for authoritarianism
would presumably disappear.

While the first line of reasoning is

usually found in the nee-Marxist literature, the latter is often sug,...
gested in the Capitalism-Now Freedom-later literature.
Both lines of reasoning frequently make reference to \'That con
temporary mainstream academic econanics says and does not say regarding
openness and several economic variables which may influence a country's
political regime.

The next section of this essay will sketch my(perhaps

idiosyncratic)understanding of that matter.
\I

It should be useful in

such an exercise to differentiate between what

be tenned the academic
. 1/
and practical orthodoxies of mainstream econor.rl.cs.-- The fonner is
may

the product of leading academic centers, is careful in stating its
assumptions and conclusions, and tends toward flexibility and agnos
ticism.

Its leading thinkers often are its own major critics, fre

quently curious about heterodox notions.

For the topic at hand,

glittering examples include James Meade, Bertil Ohlin, and Paul Samuel
son.

Practical orthodoxy is more assertive:

it is found in editorials

of the business press, am:,ng those who sought only "bottom-line"
knowledge or just a smattering of paradi~tic "carrnon-sense" !ran

t.
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their .Master or even Ph.D. degrees, and among some of the nnre politically
or financially ambitious (or simply lazy) academics away from the rigor
of their Chairs.

The main focus of the next section will be on academic

orthodoxy; practical orthodoxy will not receive much attention, although
its importance in the political world and 1n confusing the topic at hand
1s not denied.

The third section of this essay will be a rather quick overview of
key events in Latin American economic history up to the mid-1960s which
have helped to mold perceptions about openr.ess.

Since the discovery of

the continent, Latin America has undergone a number of.economic openings
and closings, each leaving behind crucial memories which naturally in
fluence one's gut reaction 1n discussing the topic of openness (s~y
"sugar" to Cubans and

many

will reply "slavery'').

The economic history

of various Latin American countries should also provide, if not rigorous
tests, at least some notion of the robustness of generalizations about
links am:>ng openness, domestic econctnic variables and authoritarianism.

The fourth section will extend the historical na.rTa.tive to the

\

\

rest of the 1960s and to the 1970s, a period s:!n!sll.larly traumatic for
the region, when discussions about openness and authoritarianism became
particularly urgent.

A final section will present what I rep:ard as

the few valid generalizations arising from the rest of the essay and the
many

questions left open.
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2. FRCT1 THE MAINSTREAM:
Cpenness

may

SWRDY PROPOSITIONS OR CHilitERICAL FA~ASIES?

refer to international trade in goods and services,

or to international nows of capital and labor.

Modern academic ortho

doxy, contrary to popular impressions, has had surprisingly little to
say about the welfare consequences of international factor flows.

Until

fairly recently, the bulk of serious research on international economics
referred to cor.rnodity trade:

the profession analysed nations exchanging

wine for cloth, apples for blankets.
For many years I have been puzzled by the animosity shown by some
heterodox econanists toward the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson models of
international trade developed since the Second World War.

Compared with

earlier mainstream views of international trade, the modern fonrru

lations are much m::>re m::>dest about what can be claimed in favour of
!'ree trade and contain results which earlier orthodox economists regard
as troublesome.

For example, the Stolper-Sarnuelson theorem rigorously

showed that freer trade policies could make some members of a nation
absolutely worse off; in other words, not only were the gains from trade
unequally distributed within a country, but for some groups there could
also be losses under laissez-faire.

Post-war welfare economics also

emphasised that unless those benefitting from a certain policy actually
con:pensated those made worse off by it, one could not say that the
policy was desirable.
A recent interchange between Ronald Findlay and Gottfried F..aberler

illustrates this contrast between the new and the old.

Haberler first

stated that incorre distribution within LDCs had nothing to do with the
international econanic order.

theorem.

Haberler replied:

Findlay invoked the Stolper-Samuel son
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"As far as the Stepler-Samuelson theorem is concerned, I would· say
that it is ingenious fran the purely theoretical standpoint but
is of no help in the present context, because it is based on a
two-factor m::x::iel and breaks down, as Stopler and Sarm.lelson
recognize, when we introduce, as we surely rnust, more than two
factors and two types of income, different types of labour,
salaries, profits, interests, and so on. I therefore conclude
that nw statement that inequality of income has very 11ttle to
do with the international order has emerged pretty much unscathed
from the discussion. And the little systematic influence trade
21
may have on income distribution may ••• go 1n either direction ••• "\vhether an assumption is judged to be a brilliant s1mplification
or an unexcusable distortion of reality very nruch depends on whether
one likes the conclusions drawn fran it.

The Findlay approach is an

eJCa!ll)le of modern academic orthodoxy at its best:

using

its analytical

tools it opens the way to systematic exploration of links between trade
and income distribution, replacing the somewhat obscurantist older view,
so timid in granting the possibility that anybody may be hurt by
openings.

The Findlay approach will not reach simple conclusions such

as "trade benefits everybody" or "trade hurts everybody".

It all

depends (to the dismay of the lazy, the impatient or the _seeker of rnass
m::>bilising slogans) on the circwnstances in which the trade takes place.

\

But modern academic orthodoxy goes beyond boorish skeptical ip;norance.
Take a country whose most abundant factor of production is land;
a trade opening should witness land-intensive exports and benefits to
landowners.

This could improve income distribution if land is scattered

evenly among sturdy Jeffersonian families and if the other major factor
of production is a bundle of urban capital and labour, made up of a
minority of families who had benefitted fran trade prohibitions.

Under

these c1rcwnstances, a plausible conjecture is that freer trade will
also strengthen derrncratic forces and contribute to a freer flow of ideas.
Latin American history does not provide rnan.y examples of this possibility,
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althou gh Costa Rica and sane Colc:rnbian coffe e-gro ~ areas approach
it.
But the point to be made here is that one cannot say nruch about the link
between trade and income distri butio n without knowing something about
the
distri butio n of land. If only one family owns the land, it seems foolis
h
to blame free trade for a bad income distri bution . Decre asing trade
witho ut touching land tenure will be an expensive and probab ly short
lived wa._v to improve income distri bution .
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson positi ve theory of the struct ure
of intern ationa l trade assumes that a given produ ction functi on for each
indus try is.known to all economic agents all over the world . The model
can acconm::>date differ ences and changes in techno logy, but
not gr-ace fully.

Continuous innov ations , both in produ ction proces ses and in produ cts,
und their intern ationa l diffus ion seem best handled in other :rrodels,
which may includ e economies of scale and produ ct differ entiat ion.

Tech

nolog ical change not instan tly diffus ed will natur ally gener ate quasi

~nts. to those origin ating it; leader s may have to contin ually innova
te
not just to grow but even to maint ain their real income in the presen
ce
of techno logica l borrowing by follow er count ries. The market for techno
will show obvious differ ences from markets for cloth and wine; it is
not
clear that free trade in techno logy will benef it both sides, and leader
s
will be tempted to restri ct their sales.

As noted by Paul R.

Krt.lpJnan:

"Success by less developed countr ies in accele rating their
adoption of new techni ques can leave workers in developed
countr ies worse off; and it is easy to imagine that by
encouraging protec tionis m such success could be self-d efeati ng."
It is intere sting that these words appeared not in the Journ al of the
Union of Radical Politi cal Economists, but in public ation not famous
for 1ts hetero doxy) !

logy
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Other post-war theoretical developments have added to the need for
care in.making the case for openness.

Second-best theorising opened

a Pandora's box of IT10dels that.,by noting that sane markets were either
missing or incomplete, by assuming this market imperfectio n or that
instrument limitation., could lead to a disconcerti ng variety of results
regarding the effects of freer trade on welfare and desirable policies.
Under certain assumptions., yet using modern orthodox methodology, it
can be sho;~n that free trade would lead to a worsening of a country's
welfare; autarky would be preferable to free trade.

Even technologic al

change and growth can be shown to be inmiserisin g for a country under
sane

circumstances.

True, the rnaj or message of these models is that

while govenunent actions are required to correct distortions , and thus
laissez-fai re is out., it is unlikely that first-best policies would
involve trade restriction s, so free or freer trade was still desirable.
But if first-best policies are not feasible, a great deal can be justified
depending on one's ju~nt on particular constra.1nts and willingness

'

to accept noneconor.uc considerati ons.Y Judgments will differ on whether

;

one can expect the required finesse from public offJcials in charge of
these matters, but mainstream acadeinic economics does provide the analytical
tools to establish non-dogmat ically a hierarchy of policies, ranging from
first- to nth-best.
'lbere ~ a serious gap 1n the a.ITay of analytical tools provided by
mainstream trade theorists, who typically rely on the methodology of
cooparative statics.

The path between two equilibrium situations is

seldom discussed, because standard m:x:iels are not suitable for those
exploration s.

The policy maker who wonders what will happen on the wczy

to freer trade may get some sensible advice but few finn predictions

fran the scrupulous trade theorist.

Practical-or thodox quacks have
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often rushed 1n to fill this gap in academic analysis.
Just as 191q-1950 bred pess1m1sm regarding the net benefits of
internati onal trade, 1950-1973 was conducive to opt:imisrn.

The

sturdy academic propositi on that some trade can potential ly make
everyone better off, as compared with no trade, was increasin gly turned
by some practical orthodox into the convictio n that mre trade at all

times, places and condition s will not only improve efficienc y and
accelerat e growth, but also increase enployment, improve income dis
tribution and reduce governmental corruptio n.
naturqlly followed was:

The question that

If all of these good things,

wey not political

deroocracy also?
It was perhaps the exaggerated claims made for the benefits of freer
trade that led

SO?l)?

observers to wonder how such a wonderful economic

engine could often be associate d with roonstrous political machines.
It was only a small further step in the dialectic al crescendo to argue
. that authorita rian politics was a necessary condition (and to sane
perhaps not too high a price to pay) to obtain such wondrous economic
results for at least part of the populatio n.
The

1950-1973 period also witnessed the blooming of transnati onal

enterpris es (TNEs).

"Wine Inc. II and "Cloth Inc. II spanned the

world and every year came out with a "New Apple" and a "New Cloth.
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'Ihe question that must be asked is whether this is irrelevan t insti

tutional detail or something likely to rrooify even sturdy mainstream
propositi ons.

Does it matter for econanics or politics whether

exporters are Jefferson ian family fanners or Differen tiated Apples,I nc.,
-

an integrate d agrobusin ess which handles apples frcm seed to roouth
and hires the Mid-Ocean Auctionee r as PR man?

This is a tougher

9

challeng e to mainstream orthodoxy than complicated neo-Ric ardian models

of steady- state gro'i,th and heterogeneous capital goods, which can
generate ahistori cal chimeri cal fantasie s of their own. 51 Indeed,
several kinds of traditio nal economic theorie s, from neoclas sical to
Marxist , are uneasy in the presence of imperfe ct competi tion and its
m::xiem corpora tion, and standard democratic theory has little roan
for "corpora te citizens ."
'Ihat so much of technic al change is generate d or diffused by
oligopo lies further complic ates the analysi s.

Given the diversi ty

of special assets and of the stimuli triggeri ng foreign investm ent,
one may doubt ~prior i claims regardin g unambiguous welfare impli-

.

6/
cations of TNE activit ies.This is reinforc ed by noting ;he heterogeneity of LOCs, not just in domestic market size and natural resourc e
endowment, but also_in the respons iveness of their government officia ls

to differen t domestic social groups and in the bargain ing ability of
those officia ls.

\

Such an agnostic approach is in the spirit of that

line of economic thought which teaches that private profit-s eeking
behaviour may lead to socially desirab le results but only if certain
conditio ns are met, conditio ns which involve both economic and politic al
variable s, and whose presence cannot either be taken for granted nor
regarded as impossible under LOC conditio ns.
'lbe analysis of trade and investment in the context of specific
historic al circumstances should clear up at least some of the 1.mcan
fortable mists of agnostic ism left by the "it all depends" of theoris ts.
We have not discusse d mainstream theoret ical analysi s of interna tional
nows of labour, a topic that only recently is being rediscov ered in
major academic centers.

Many

have noted the contras ting reaction s to
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a freer now of capital vs a freer now of labor among observers,
including academic ones, in the industrializ ed world.

Market im

perfections , noneconomic reasons, or just "corrmon sense" are 100re
readily found to justify 11mit1ng the flow of the latter. 7/ 'Ihl.s
is how Gottfried Haberler reacted to Ronald Findlay's observation
that a truly liberal internation al order should provide free
rooverrent not only of goods and capital but also of people:
"I, for one, simply took it for granted that there is no
free migration from the LDCs to the DCs, and only in a
few rare cases between the DCs, nor is ·there free migration
between the LDCs for that matter. One may deplore this,
but it would be unrealistic to expect a change. It is
even doubtful whether a greater internation al mobility of
labor can be regarded as desirable from the standpoint of
internation al peace and harmony, despite the economic
benefits for all participant s that may be expected." -81

3. SCT1E OPENINGS AND CLOSINGS IN LATIN .AMERICAN HimDRY
Writers on the political economy of Latin America seem almost
obsessed with the external sector as the source of all that is good
or bad in the region.2-1 This is not surprising given the history of
Latin .America.

The

conquest of the continent was a sui generis

forced opening of native economies making most local residents teITibly
worse off.

(So far no bright cliometrici an has challenged this con

ventional wisdom; Iberian conquistado res are perhaps less charismatic
than Southern slaveowners ).

No fancy algebra nor definitiona l exer

cises are needed to call the system that emerged one of exploitatio n
or unequal exchange.

Ehcomiendas, slavery and debt-peonage charac

terised "the labour market;" royal favours, legal trickery and the
force of arms cleared "the land market".
countries, comnodities and even harbours.

Trade was limited as to
Future generations were

'.
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to renanber not only the trauma of forced opening but also the peculiar
prosperity it yielded the conquering nations.

'Ihoughtful Mexicans

and Venezuelans, contemplating their present oil riches, wisely recall

the m:?lancholy rise and fall of Spain during the Sixteenth and Seven
teenth centuries.

An opening based on exhaustible natural resources,

whether silver or oil, may make you very well off today but may induce
habits and economic and social structures that, when the silver and
oil run out, will make you sink back to a poverty perhaps worse than
that of pre-bonanza days.

Judicious intertsnporal trade am::mg generations

of the sane society, i.e. , maintaining a prudent balance between con
sun:ption today and tororrow, must accompany international trade based
on exhaustible natural resources, otherwise openings may not lead to
permanent gains.

Even in the ~ase of trade based on non-exhaustible

natural resources yielding easy rents there are obvious dangers that
a society may fail to expand ipto other sources of profitable trade.
The Bourbon liberalisation of decrepit Iberian rnercantilism during

the second half of the Eighteenth century led to export-led booms in
many

parts of Latin America.

As the appetite grew with the eating,

local elites became increasingly restless and resentful of the still
extensive trade restrictions.

Most of the leaders of the Latin American

independence rovernents blamed Iberian crowns for artificially delinking
the region from promising external markets.

An 1800 tour of the

"de-linker" Sam1r ~ through the nourishing "Economic Societies of
Friends of the Country" might have required an escort of loyalist troops
(or of poor but royalist pardos).

To

the patriotic intellectuals it

was clear at that point that the less enlightened a despot and the

greater the degree of political tyranny, the more trade restrictions
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ooe would find.

Arrogant and often ignoran t Iberian bureauc rats had

roore to do with the popular ity of such an idea than the writing s of
the periphe ral Scot.
'lhe excessiv e hopes of the liberal patriots were dashed during

the chaotic 1820s.

'Ihe destruc tion and disorga nisation caused by the

wars of independence, veritab le civil wars, and tmfavor able interna tional

market conditio ns combined to make post-lib eration openings weak or
ambiguous in their impact on growth.

Even if the supply was willing. ,

the demand was weak; as noted by Arthur Lewis, before the second half
of the nineteen th century the British and European industr ial revoluti ons·
needed few inputs from today's Third World. 111 The United States South
dondnated the cotton trade., and only a few luxury product s, such as
sugar, could overcome high transpo rt costs, thanks largely to slavery
and the "mining" of new soils.

'Ihe post-ind ependen ce decades are one.

of the m::>st obscure periods in Latin American economic history , but
one may conjectu re that in m::>st of the region per capita incomes in
\;

1850 were below those of 1800.

After a burst of libertar ian measure s,

inrnedia tely following independence, a conserv ative and traditio nalist
. reaction spread throughout m:::>st of the new nations , generat ing titanic
despots , who to this day exert enormous fascina tion.
Indeed, in the feverish intellec tual climate of the 1960s., those
great tyrants., who had allied themselves with a very pre-Mar yknoll
Church and had opposed public educatio n, were rediscov ered and glorifie d
by some segments of the left.

The obscuri ty of the period encouraged

their being perceive d as great industr ialisers and opponents of "the
inperial ism of free trade." The liberals were cast as the destroy ers
of local crafts and manufac tures, 1n an unholy alliance with British
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1.nperialism.

By

some of these revisioni st accotmts, a good share of the

time of British leadershi p during the first half of the Nineteent h
century was devoted to snuffing out Paraguayan industria lisation.

'Ilus

type of revisionis m has not spread to Mexico, whose Nineteenth century
conservat ives ended not with the courageous stand of a Lopez but
behind the weak shield of a .Maxdlnilian.
By

the last third of the Nineteenth century growing demand in

Europe and North America for pr1mary products and a drastic lowering
of ocean freight-c osts presented tempting trade options to most Latin
American countries .

local resource endowments and probably domestic

politics influence d the rapidity and degree of the openings that took
place and which continued at·least until the First World War.

Thus,

the Argentine and Uruguayan openings canE earlier and went further than
that of Colombia, whose civil wars continued until the beginning of
this century.
By

the late 1920s Latin America actively participa ted in inter

national trade, was an important recipient of internati onal capital flows,
and sane countries had witnessed large inflows of labour.

Monetary

arrangements by the late 1920s tended to conform with the restored
internati onal gold standard.

Relative to its past and future history,

the region probably reached its rnaJdnn.Im degree of opening toward trade,
capital and labour during the 1920s. '!he crude indicator s of opening
and development shown in Table 1 emphasise the heterogen eity found
1n the region regarding both opening and development; c~are the

figures for Argentina , Chile, Cuba, and Uruguay, at one extreme, with
those for m:>st of the Caribbean and Central .America, Bolivia, and
Ecuador at the other.
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We do not have indices of political democracy for those years;
nor do we have estimates of per capita income for rrore than a handful

of countries.

'Ihe per capita imports shown in Table 1 are likely to

be highly correlated with two variables:

positively with per capita

incane and negatively with size of country, measured by population.
Bearing these two offsetting influences in mind and leaving aside

colonial or quasi-colon ial territories , Table 1 suggests that the
degree of political democracy in La.tin America in the 1920s was cor
related with per capita income.

fut the ccrrelation is unlikely to be

very high, and as later years were to show, far from robust.

Table 1

offers the stronger hint that in the 1920s relatively high per capita
incorres went together with a nigh degree of opening to both trade
and investment, even if openings were to be measured not as per capita
trade and investllEnt but as trade as a share of gross national product,
and as foreign investment as a percentage of all capital.

Again,

however, such gross correlation s are unlikely to take us very far, at
\

least using ranges observed in La.tin America.

\

Specific features of

national histories are likely to dominate the explanatory power of
macroeconomic variables.
Take,for example, the cases of Chile, Cuba, and Uruguay as they
stood in the late 1920s.

Their per capita incomes were probably

roughly similar, as were their populations and opening to trade.

Yet

both the extravagant Cuban opening to foreign capital and its miserable
politics rrru.st be explained by its quasi-colon ial status and by geography.
l)orrestic income distributio n and politics in these three countries also
had something to do with the characteris tics of major export products:

mineral, tropical and temperate staples surely had different Hirschmanesque
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TABLE 1
Indicators of Openness and Development; Latin America circa 1928
Openness

Development

CUrrent US$ per capita
Stock of
Imports British and
U.S.
Investments
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
British West Indies
Chile
Colanbia
Costa Rice
CUba

Daninican Republic
F.cuador
French West Indies
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama

Paraguay
Peru

Puerto Rico
Salvador
Uruguay

Venezuela

$80
9
10
41
33
16
35
72
27
5
22
10
7
15
11

16
29
14
13
76
9
50
23

Percenta;,:es of
Po ulation
In cities Able to
of 25,000 read and
or over
write

$258
56
47
na
195
41
134
494
24
24
::.na
39
12
52
172
43
88
34
53

35
9
13
na
27
17
11
24
3
11
na
15
5
4
15
17
19
20
10

60
30
26
na
44
25
30
48
41
20
na
25
10
28
38
20
26
40
24

na

na.

na

15

18

164
82

30
9

35
62
29

Per 1,000
Inhabitants
Railway
Telephones
miles
22

4
5
2

13
2
9
8
1
3
na.
2

1
14
9
3
6
5
4
2
2
11
2

19
1
3
6
8
3
5
18'
2
2
3
1
1
2
4
2
16
1
2
9
2
16

Source: Max Winkler, Investments of United States Canital in Latin America.
Port Was~on, New York: Kennikat Press, 1971 (First published 1n 1928))

pp. 276, 278, 283 and 286-7.

The letters na indicate data are not available.
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linkages.

Post 1929 history for these three countries also shows the

bewildering variety of political paths which

may

be taken even by

econanies similar in per capita income and their degree of opening

to trade. But a detailed corr;:,arison of these three fascinating econcm:1es
. and polities cannot be undertaken here.
'!here are additional measures of openings besides the ones suggested
in earlier paragraphs.

An

important one would be a country's policies

toward trade and international flows of capital and labour.

One could,

for ex~le, conpare levels and structures of tariffs and subsidies on
traded goods and quantitative restrictions on investment and migration.
Domestic policies, factor endowments and other domestic variables
interacting with external conditions will in fact yield such observed
measures of opening as inports as a percentage of gross proc".uct.
Regarding tariffs, the then predornmant instrument to restrict trade, it

would be difficult to argue that in the 1920s protectionism was a
general banner of progressive political nx:>vements in Latin .America.
..

,

The

.

Argentine Socialist Party was finnly for free trade in goods (and for
the gold standard as well).

One of the roost interesting protectionist

experiments during that decade in Latin America occurred, of all places,
in Cuba, and was sponsored by General Gerardo Machado, known otherwise
as

''The Butcher." The Leguia dictatorship in Peru was frankly pro

tectionist, at least since 1922.

Contrary to widespread misconceptions,

Iatin .American countries did not embrace free trade absolutely even
during export booms.

In nx:>st countries tariffs were fairly high both

for revenue and for mildly protectionist purposes.

A nx:>dest but signi

ficant irrport-substituting industrialisation process had started in
countries before 1929.

Argentina and Brazil witnessed in the 1920s

many
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tariff~Jurll>ing direct foreign investment in manufacturing.

In many

coi.mtries there were severe criticisms of ronoculture and the con
centration of exports on a few markets.

But these legitimate pre:

occupations typically led to prescriptions for diversifying export
products and markets rather than delinking from the international
econorey.
A clearer picture existed regarding foreign capital, where the

need to bargain and regulate roore effectively was felt from the Rio
Grande to Patagonia.

Modem mainstream theorists, aware of the

oligopolistic nature of many industries where foreign capital concen
trated, and of the Ricardian and Hotelling rents yielded by natural
resources exploited by foreigri enterprise, may find little to quarrel
about with the rn::x:iest Latin American aspirations of .those years.
Some types of international labour nows were also viewed w1 th disfavour

aroong progressives and others; most democratic Cuban opinion disliked
the inflows of labour from elsewhere in the Caribbean during the sugar
harvest.

Such species of labour protectionism was not without racist

overtones, like that practiced in Australia for many years, and that
which marked the end of laissez-passer in the United States during the

1920s.
A comparison between Latin America and Africa and Asia circa 1928

was bound to suggest net positive dividends in tenns of economic and
political welfare due to soveriegnty and a sustained non-preferential
opening to global international trade, in spite of the ot)vious flaws in

Iatin American societies:

skewed income and wealth distribution,

vulnerability to shocks from the world economy, an irritating reliance
on foreign capital and limited political participation by broad segments

18
of the populatio n.

A conpariso n between the La.tin America of 1928

with that of 1878 would have yielded a similar feeling of relative
satisfact ion, in contrast with an 1828-1878 comparison and, alas,
also in contrast with a 1928-1978 Southern Cone comparison.
Depression and war generated external demand and supply shocks to
La.tin American economies during the 1930s and 1940s. Trade declined
absolutel y and relative to gross national product; capital nows practical ly
disappear ed as early as 1929; and domestic rural-urb an migration s dwarfed
any internati onal ones. 'lhe relativel y healthy reaction of many countries
1n the region to those cataclvsm ic events has often been narrated: dcrnestic

manufactures and even primary products replaced many imports,a nd domestic
savings financed nearly all capital formatioJ .E'nur1ng the early years of
';he crisis nost incumbent adm1n.1strations were swept out of power;few other
politica l generalis ations seem possible. Import substitut ing industrialisat ion proceeded under Conservative regimes as in Argentina , as
well as under Refonnist ones, as .in Mexico.

Changes in relative prices,

generated .in world markets or as a consequence of attempts to equilibra te

the balance of payments, plus stop-gap measures to deal with depressed
demand were observed in nost countries with some degree of autonany .in
economic policy, regardles s of the precise colourati on of governinents.
'lhese closings of the 1930s and early 1940s did stimulate inventive 
ness 8I!X)ng public and private actors.

New public agencies to promote

developne nt were created and new national entrepren eurs appear to have
cane to the fore.

'Ihe economic and political power of export-or iented

tradition al landowners waned.

By

the end of the Second World War the

relative position of La.tin America in the world economy looked strong,
and these nations had a rocx::lest but significa nt voice in the emerging
Bretton Woods institutio ns and the United Nations.
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But Latin America during the 1930s and 1940s appears healthy
relative to the depths of depressio n and the destructi on and political
horrors elsewhere.

It is doubtful that~ capita incomes grew during

1929-45 faster than during earlier decades; available evidence shows
that they grew less than in later years.

F.xcept for Brazil,

manufacturing growth was lower during 1929-45 than in earlier or later
years. 'Ille relativel y good perfonnance of countries with significa nt
autonOO\Y in econanic policy, including not only large countries like
Argentina and .Brazil but also Chile and UI"Ugl..ley, was to an 1mportant ·
extent based on the economic and institutio nal infrastru cture de
veloped during the era of export-le d growth.

Large pre-1929 exports

in those countries led to the high per capita imports reported in
Table l; those high per capita 1mports provided rich and obvious
targets for entrepren eurs during 1929-45.
'Ihe :1nrned1ate post-war years, say 1946~48, may have witnessed the
peak

\

•

of Latin America euphoria.

In most countries , external demand for

tradition al exports boomed again, and the supply of capital goods and
intermedi ate products still difficult to produce in ~he region was be
corrdng rore plentiful than in earlier years.

Contrary to the gloaey

views of some conservat ive observers , industria lisation not only main
tained gains registere d during the war but advanced further in the
post-war world.

It was during 1946-48 when value added in Latin American

manufacturing surpassed that in rural activitie s.

As late as 1953,

when he should have known better, General Peron was telling General
· Ibanez, then President of Chile, that there is nothing more elastic

than the econany.

As noted by Albert Hirscmnan the industria lisation

of the 1930s and 1940s (coupled with favourabl e terms of trade during
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the imnediate post-w ar period ) led to delusi ons of economic invuln er
abilit y arrong some policy ma.kers. 131

If 1rnport subst itutio n, protec tion and rigoro us exchange contro ls
had done so well during the 1930s and 1940s, why not cont:1n
ue and

streng then those polici es? 'Ihe fierce protec tionis m and arroga nt
economic nation alism embraced by major indus trialis ed count ries since
the late 1920s had scarre d periph eral nation s who prior to 1929 had
alloca ted their meagre resour ces largel y on the assumption that hegem
onic
powers were seriou s about free trade and conve rtibili ty. The Bretto n
Woods agreement and the Intern ationa l Trade Organ isation (I'ID)
promised

a partia l return to freer trade and some conve rtibili ty, but the aborti ve
Britis h return to conve rtibili ty in 1947 and the 1950 death of rro in
t.he

United States Congress were ominous signs.

A sharp recess ion in

the United States during 1948-49 and the diffic ulties experi enced by
European post-war recon struct ion (befor e the Marsh all Plan) revive d
f'ears of a new Great Depre ssion.

The coup d'etat :1n Prague and the

Berl:1n blockade in 1948, the victor y of the Chine st cormnmists in 1949,
and the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 made those foreca sting an
inrninent world war worthy of at least a hearin g. Even if a hot world
war was avoided, a prolon ged cold

war between the two superpowers looked

very likely , as evidenced by the signin g of the North Atlan
tic Treaty

Organ ization (NAID) and the detona tion of the first Sovie t atomic bc:rnb

Im economic opening under those circum stance s seemed to imply for
·ratin American count ries the abandonment of any preten sions
to an

independent foreig n policy ._

Many

pre-war European marke ts appeared

lost or reduced; the old contin ent could not be counted on, as in the
past, to act as an offse tting influe nce to that of the United States .
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Around 1950 "The Third Position" was the monopoly of Argentina, Spain,
Sweden, and Switzerland, neither a politically homogeneous group nor
a formidable economic block.

Naturally, those who had prospered in

Latin America under the protective circumstances of the 1930s and
1940s made the rost of the gloomy outlook for the international econonzy'.
Shortages of external supplies of steel, shipping, and weapons during
the early 1940s placed

many

a member of the Latin American Armed Forces

in the post-war protectionist camp.
'Ihe 1950s mood of export pessimism, which nevertheless rejected

autarky, predominating in Brazil and the Southern Cone countries well
into the 1960s, was expressed in a 1953 report of the United Nations
Economic Corrr.lission for Latin America.

Discussing possible export

incentives, the report noted the instability of foreign markets, adding:
"A sharp fall in prices, such as that which occurred a short
time ago, while retaining some of the benefits from the
increase preceding the Korean War, revives a series of previous
vicissitudes which hardly encourage production for export.
Although coffee prices are today relatively high, it should
not be forgotten that Brazil was once obliged to destroy large
unsaleable stocks of this carrrnodity. For similar reasons,
during the war, Argentina accumulated several grain harvests
which had later to be wasted as emergency fuel. In contrast,
the prospects on the domestic market are generally more stable,
above all, in manufacturinp; activities. Indust!"J, however,
l4/
requires certain exports which provide it with essential J2;oods."Saoo rredium and large Latin American countries, such as Mexico

and Peru, early in the post-war phased out a good part of their depression
and war time policies, roving towards roore evenhanded incentives between
exports and 1rnport substitution, while retaining non-trivial levels of
protection.

The Peruvian transition was managed by the dictatorship

of General Odria; the Mexican one occurred tmder the administration s
heir to the Mexican Revolution.

Central American countries, which had

exercised little policy choice during 1929-45, on the whole continued to

22

ride along with the impulses emanating from abroad, come what may.

'Ihese ~ l , open and mostly passive economies register ed as a group
1npress1ve growth rates in exports and gross nationa l product during
the 1950s and 1960s.

Those two decades also witnesse d economic

expansion in both Mexico and Peru.

Curious ly, the relative ly open

and fast-gro wing Central American and Peruvian economies moved toward
greater protecti onism during the early 1960s, perhaps under Southern
Cone influenc es, but without reaching the extreme protecti onism of
that region.
Brazil and the Southern Cone, which so many social scienti sts seem
to regard as the whole of Latin America, struggle d along with stagnan t
exports and increasi ngly expensive inport substitu tion until around
the mid-1960s, when an opening trend, timid in some countriE"s, became
noticea ble.

The persiste nce of 1930s trade policie s into the 1950s

hurt Brazil less than Argentin a, and hurt Uruguay more than Argenti na,
the reason being that in small markets and in the context of. an expan-
ding econany the costs of protecti on, in terms of efficien cy and growth,

escalate d sharply .
Table 2 compares the dollar value of Latin .American exports during
the five years 1961 through 1965 with those register ed during 1946 through

1950, with all data at current prices.

During an interva l of fifteen

years a variety of export records were achieved .

Luck in the corrmodity

lottery and other particu lar events and circums tances influenc ed the
outcome, but a role for trade policies would be difficu lt to deny.

('Ihose

trade policie s may have led to some Latin American countrie s gaining at
the expense of others' market shares. ) Corrq:,are the performance of Chile
with that of Peru, those of Uruguay and Costa Rica, and those of

TABIE 2

Dollar Values of-Latin American Merchandise Exoorts At CU!Tent Prices, 1961-65
(Values for 1946-50 equal 100)

Nicaragua
Peru
El Salvador
Panama
F.cuador
Venezuela
Costa Rica
Mexico
Guatemala
Chile
Daninican Republic
Honduras
Colanbia
Paraguay

Haiti
Brazil
Argentina
P,olivia
Cuba
Uruguay

535
359
334
314
303
278
258
244
228
206
204
184
168
149
121
120
99
96
94
92

Source: Basic data obtained from Naciones Unidas, America Latina:
Relacion de Precios del Intercamb io. (Santiago de Chile, 1976.)
According to this source, for Latin America as a whole import
unit values 1111961-65 stood at 128, with 1946-50 equal 100
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Argen tina and Mexico.

The conjec ture that feeble extern al demand during

the 1950~ induced the persis tence of favour able incen tives for 1mport
substi tution is weakened by the substa ntial expor t expansions of many
count ries, large and small.

Sorooza's Nicaragua heads the list, and the

then democratic Uruguay is at the bottom, but no robus t politi cal
gener alisat ions emerge from Table 2. Costa Rica does somewhat bette r

than Guatemala, while Paraguay and Haiti have expor t performances
about as dismal as that of the then deroocratic Brazi l.
When a longer restro specti ve look is taken at the evolu tion of
La.tin .American foreig n trade, the astoni shing fact emerges that in most
count ries (or at least in count ries where the larges t share of Latin
Americans live) per caoita impor ts, measured at consta nt price s, were
during the early 1960s below, in some cases subst antial ly below, levels
reache d during the late 1920s. Table 3 lists count ries for which such
data are availa ble.

The growth in per capita Gross Nation al Product

which occurred during that interv al clearl y involv ed profound shifts
in
both produ ction and consumption struct ures. The fine performance of
El Salvador is a reminder, if one is needed, that a prospe rous
extern al sector need not elimin ate all development problems. The
simila r performance of Mexico and Venezuela is also intere sting;
the latter underwent an oil boom during the period covered in Table 3,
while the former saw its oil expor ts dwindle and vanish after the

1938 nation alisat ions.
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TABIE 3

Per Gapita Imoort Quantum of Some Latin American Countries

In 1963-65 Relative to 1928-30
(1928-30 = 100)

Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Chile
Ecuador
El Salvador
Mexico
Peru
Venezuela

38
60

71
59
171

259
90
201

92

Sources: Merchandise imports at constant 1963 dollar prices obtained
!'rom Naciones Unidas, America Latina: Relacion de Precios del Intercambio
(Santiago de Chile, 1976).

Population data obtained !'rom United Nations,

Statistical Bulletin for Latin America (New York, March 1964).
data refer to 1929~30 and 1964-65.

Peruvian
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4. OPENINGS SINCE THE MID-1960s
'lhi~ section will review some salient features of the trade and

financial openings which have occurred in Latin America since approx
imately the mid-1960s.

The variety of experiments has been large;

that variety has existed regarding timing, persisten ce, instrume ntation,
political circumsta nces, and even direction of policy trends.

For

example, Colombia has on the whole followed a clear trend toward
opening in trade since 1966, 1n the sense of nx:>ving toward more balanced

incentive s between export and inport-su bstituting activitie s, while
Brazil moved in that direction during 1964-73, showing some hesitatio ns
since then.

However, both countries have maintaine d throughou t sig

nificant restrictio ns on capital flows.

::ea

Argentine political instabili ty

to bewildering changes in trading and payments policies during

1963-81.

The Peruvian Armed Forces marched against the general trend

in the late 1960s and 1970s, but the new constitut ional administr ation
is returning to tradition al Peruvian policies.

In spite of their variety,

sare generalis ations regarding the economic results of the openings may
be presented .

The heterogen eous political circumsta nces surroundi ng

the openings will also be noted.
Moves toward export promotion worked in the sense that the target of
expanding exports was achieved.

Export pessimist s were simply wrong;

when incentive s were provided both domestic supply and external demand
proved to be sufficien tly elastic.

While Brazilian and Colombian mer

chandise exports, measured at current dollar prices, expanded between
· 1970-71 and 1978-79 at an annual rate of 22 percent, those for Peru

grew at only 12 percent. 1'.'ast export growth was accorrpanied by sub
stantial corranodity diversifi cation; by 1981 coffee aroounted to less
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than 15 percent of Brazilian merchandise exports, a fact few would
have forecasted in 1963.

Fast export growth, it should be emphasised,

need not be accoll;)anied by laissez-fai re policies, nor indeed by the
el1m:1nation of all protection.

Brazilian and Colombian export achieve

ments have been registered while substantial (excessive for

many

sectors) protection was maintained, and with the public sector actively
intervening in the export drive.

Such "Japanese approach" toward

export promotion seems to have been followed by some Asian super-expo rters,
e.g., South Korea and Taiwan, countries which have maintained nontrivial import restriction s and rigorous exchange controls, while
relying on subsidised credit, public enterprises and managed exchange
rates as parts of their polic 1 package.

These experiences suggest

that 1n a dynamic context the best index of trade openness for indus
trialising countries may not be relative levels of effective rates of
protection and subsidisatio n as betwen import substitutio n and exports,
but actual export growth rates, particularl y those for non-traditi onal
exports.

Imports, after all, are the tangible fruits of the gains

from trade, and if exports grow at a high and sustained fashion, i..rnports
will follow suit sooner or later.
Export prorotion does not, as is often portrayed, inevitably lead
to greater dependence on "the capitalist- imperialis t center." This can
be seen in Table 4 which shows the geographica l destination of increases

in merchandise exports for several La.tin American countries between the
averages for 1970-71 and 1978-79.

'Ihe degree of diversifica tion and the

relatively roodest share going to the United States, the traditional ly
hegem::,nic power of the region, are remarkable.

It is noteworthy that the

country whose exports grew least, Peru, shows the greatest concentrati on
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two markets.

Cc:n;,are also Peruvian and Uruguayan trade

w1 th

Other

Western Hemisphere countries 1n Table 4; note that the fonner was a
rhetorical charrl)ion of Iatin .American integration during the 1970s.
Adding the figures for oil exporting countries (which include Venezuela)
plus Other Western Hemisphere countries yields the highest numbers
for Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, three countries that by the late

1970s were hardly champions of third world solidarity.
Behind the aggregate figures there is further evidence that the
realities of a nn.lltipolar trading world seE".m to have been missed by the
metaphysical categories of some "delinkers", whose writings would not
prepare their readers to expect massive trade between an Argentina
ruled by conservative military and the U.S.S.R., nor significant Brazilian
exports of weapons to the Midc..le East, nor active commercial links between
post-1973 Chile and China.
· 'lbe tra.ditional primary products/manufactures dichotc:my can also
be misleading.

Both economically and politically, in the world of 1981

exporters of wheat, soybeans and corn look better than exporters of
steel and petrochemicals.

As an example contrast the economic benefits

and international autonorey the latter industries have brought Argentina,
· with those generated from Argentine sales of corn, sorghum and beef to
the Soviets.

'lhere is considerable evidence for the post-war years showing that
1n the medium- and the long-term faster export growth has been associated

with faster growth in Gross Domestic Product, even leaving aside from
the latter the value added by the export sector. 151 Faster growth also
appears to have been associated with larger expansions of employment
opporttmities in rrx:x:lern sectors.

Beyond that the cla1ms for export-led
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TABLE 4

Geographical Destination of Increases in Merchandise Exports
Between 1970-71 and 1978-79
(Percentage of total increase)

Argentina
United States
Japan

European EconOOJ.ic Corrrnunity
011 exporting countries
Other Western Hemisphere
i
{;Ountres
USSR, Eastern Europe

7
6

31

Peru

Uruguay

Brazil

Chile

Colcmbia

20

12
9

30

17

4

2

28

30
13

28

5

42

.6

29
7

2

5
22

14

5
29

and China

12

7

3

3

7

3

Other countries

17

17

13

15

13

6

Memo: Average annual
percentage growth rate
of exports, at current
dollar prices

19

22

14

22

12

16

Sources: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade
'Yearbook. Washington D.C., several issues. "011 exportinp; countries"
includes Venezuela. "other Western Hemisphere" covers basically
Latin America and the C.ar-ibbean, excluding Canada and Venezuela
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growth achieved in La.tin America become weaker.

'Ihe effects on income

distribut ion are complex but of unclear direction and strength, partly
because the variety of non-trad itional exports cannot be simply
labelled "labor-in tensive" nor "land-int ensive".
Neither the effect of trade openings on political change, nor the
effect of political regimes an trade policies are unambiguous.

Since

the mid-1960s, regimes m:>v:l.ng in the direction of export prorootion,
albeit at different speeds and using different instrumen ts, have
included the Frei administr ation and Pinochet goveITllTlent in Chile,
several constitut ional Colombian goveITllTlents, the second Belaunde ad

ministrat ion in Peru, and the Cuban government led by Fidel castro.
Other countries have witnessed a steady concern for a healthy export
uector, including Barbados, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay,
Trinidad-Tobago, and Venezuela.

Ecuador and Venezuela have mixed

oil exports with democratic politics, with Venezuela since 1958 having

an admirable

re~ord of constitut ional government.

Some might argue

that oil makes Venezuela a special case, but they should then explain
why Saudi Arabia has not surpassed Sweden in social derrocracy and

constitut ional liberty.
'!he open economies of Central America, while rna.inta..1ning prosperou s
export sectors, experimented with noderate collectiv e protectio n during
the 1960s; in roost countries the domestic beneficia ries of that conm:m

market appear to have been privilege d social groups not too different
ft'Orn those benefitti ng from exports.

Direct foreign investors , as else

where in La.tin America, also benefitte d from such "infant industry"
protectio n: a combination .of partial closing in trade and opening
toward direct foreign investment seems both.econ anically and political ly
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dangerous, particularly for small economies, as foreign investment can
magnify the distortive effects of excessive protection, while creating

powerful vested interests for the maintenance of trade restrictions.
Caribbean open economies flirted with the Central American approach
during the 1970s, but on the whole have maintained great concern for
dynamic exports of goods and services.

In spite of adverse economic

shocks and difficult social circumstances during the 1970s many of these
island economies have maintained fairly open political regimes; examples
include Barbados, the Ix>minican Republic and Jamaica.
Openings toward international financial nows have been more
dramatic than those toward trade.

Since the late 1960s a number of

La.tin American co1mtries have borrowed extensively from private inter
national banks; these nows have surpassed those for direct foreign
investrrent and concessional finance. This vast topic can be discussed
in great detaii, 161 but here only a few features will be highlighted,
again pointing to the non-tmiqueness of the openings-politics link.

The · ·

list of borrowing countries includes Cuba, Chile, post-revolutionary
Nicaragua, and Guatemala.

The management and instrumentation of

borrowings have been highly diverse.

For example, Brazil and Colombia

have maintained exchange controls and have closely supervised regulated
external borrowing.

On

the other hand, Argentina during 1978-81 m:,ved

close to a laissez-faire attitude toward connections between domestic
and international financial markets.

Controls over the direct presence

of international banks in domestic economies have also varied.

A look

elsewhere confinns this heterogeneous picture: rnaj or borrowers also
include Hungary and Poland, South Korea, and the Phillippines.
'1he incentives and opportunities available in international
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financia l markets interac ting with domestic financi al and exchange rate
policies .natura lly affect domestic economic actors in differen t ways,
and

politica l irrplica tions

cumstances.

may

follow from changed interna tional cir

It can be argued, for example, that the liquidi ty of the

Eurocurrency market during the 1970s allowed many La.tin .American public
enterpr ises a degree of initiati ve and autonomy not availab le previou sly.
'lhat market also strength ened the potenti al barga.1n1.ng power of
governments in negotia ting with Trans-N ational Enterpr ises as well as
with the Interna tional Monetary Fund, the World Bank and countri es
dispens ing either c.oncessional finance or selling weapons.

Financi al

pressure s by the Carter adm:lnis tration against the Chilean government
in an effort to gain human rights concessions were dulled by the
Chilean ability to borrow in the Eurocurrency market, an expedie nt also
used by the Cuban gove:mment during the 1970s.

Of course, borrowing

gives flexibi lity today but if the funds are not managed wisely, or if
one is just unlucky in the conmodity lottery , it will decreas e flexibi lity
toroorrow, _as both Peru and Poland found out.
~

types of 1970s openings toward capital nows have yielded

new experien ces and dilenrnas.

'Ihe great robility of financi al flows

has raised the possibi lity that openings to capital may conflic t with

sustaine d trade openings.

Consider the bizarre Argentine experien ce

of 1978-81 where massive borrowing sustaine d an appreci ation of the
real exchange_ rate which clashed with export prcrootion efforts .

That

Argentine experien ce shows that, at least for some years, one can wreck
both the 1mport-cornpeting and the export sectors with the gainers
from such policies includin g some bankers and a few other groups.

Chilean and Uruguayan exportin g efforts appear threaten ed by similar
conside rations.
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Dil"ect foreign investment has shown itself shier than financial
capital 1n accepting the lure of more open doors.

Regulatio ns on

'lNEs have been relaxed in many Latin American countries , althol.1P')1. the

picture remains quite heterogeneous in this field also.

Post-1973

Chile has been the clearest example of a drastic opening to~'al"d direct
foreign investmen t.

In spite of a.Jmost pathetic invitatio ns fran

Chilean authoriti es, and in spite of the rhetoric of some business
publicati ons praising investment cl.1mates created by authorita rian
regimes, the inflows of TNE investmen ts into post-1973 Chile have
been m:xlest, and not obviously higher than those going into other

economically comparable Latin American countries having stiffer
regulatio ns on direct foreign investmen t.

It is one thing to lend

other people's money and another to corrrnit one's equity, when the
stability of the rules of the game in the host country may depend on
one person's caprice or heartbeat .

5. CONCWSIONS

AND OOUBTS

Even a hasty review of Latin American economic history provides
damaging counterexaI!l)les against s1mple generalis ations about the

openness -politics link, whether of the optimist ic, classical economis ts'
variety, or of the m:>re recent dellnkers ' species. The degree
of openness of an econorey and its political system may be regarded as

just two endogenous variables in a socioeconomic general equilibriu m
system; partial correlatio ns between those two variables in isolation
are unlikely to yield robust or meaningful results.

In an interesti ng

pioneerin g study John F.O. Bilson has atten;,ted to econamet rically
explain the degree of civil liberties in 55 developed and developin g
countries as a function of several economic variables , including
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openness to international trade, measured as the ratio of exports to
Gross National Product.

Population, per capita income, share of wages

in aggregate income and other variables are included.

The coefficient

for opemess indicates a positive link with civil liberties, but it is
not statistically significant. 'Ihe only econan1c indicator found
to be a significant predictor of differences in the extent of civil
liberties was the level of per capita income. 171 'Ihese econanetric
results are compatible with our historical review for Latin America.
'!he non-uniqueness and looseness of the openness-politics link

is confirmed by other regions and other times.

Within the group of

socialist countries, Aibania, 1960s China; Pol Pot's Kampuchea, and
Romania on the whole min1rn1zed and scorned outside links.

Cuba,

Hlmgary, Poland, and Yugoslavia have maintained extensive ir_ternational

ccmrerce with anyone willing to trade with them.

At first sight such

a contrast within the socialist camp gives some (m:xiest) support to
the hypothesis of classical economists.
Over the last 60 years the Mediterranean world, always of interest

'
I

to La.tin America, has witnessed authoritarian regime_~_ which sometimes
favored delinking (Mussolini during the 1930s and Franco during the
1940s and 1950s), while at other times followed orthodox outward
oriented trade policies (Mussolini during the 1920s, Franco during
the 1960s, and the Greek colonels during the late 1960s and early
1970s).

- ,

.

..

r . .

As in the Mediterranean world, authoritarianism in Latin .America
has JTUch to do with the Armed Forces.

'Ihe nature and laws of motion

of the collection of men in uniform are the darkest black boxes in
La.tin American social science,but one may conclude that the attitude
of the Armed Forces toward Pconanic openness has been neither
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unambiguous nor steady.
particularly interesting:

The case of the Peruvian Armed Forces is
led by General Odeia, they favored across

the-board openness in trade and investment but under General Velasco
Alvarado they increased import barriers and neglected non-traditional
exports, while trying to maintain traditional exports under state direction.

Regarding capi1;;al flows the Velasco Alvarado administration borrowed sub
stantially abroad but increased controls over direct foreign investment.
The heterogeneity of economic views within the Argentine and Brazilian
.Anned

Forces is well known (and arguments about economic policies

between various factions have nx:>re alanning side effects than those
between Sam.ir .Amin and Arnold Haberger) • Armed Forces, at least in
South America, are unlikely t:> be great enthusiasts of free trade in
goods and services, will be skeptical about direct foreign investment
and financial flows, and will certainly be hostile to free migration
with neighbouring countries. Argentine and Brazilian generals in charge
of public enterprises are tmlikely to pennit tariff reductions increasing

'.

foreign competition to "their" finns.
other points noted in this essay may be worth stressing.

It does

appear possible to argue that the role of the foreign sector in Latin
American development has been exaggerated and indeed mythologised.
Of course policies towards international trade and capital play an
inportant role in tenns of efficiency and growth, and are more inportant
the smaller a country is.

Interaction with the rest of the world offers

sane potential gains; that is

why

most clever politician$ finnly in

control will try to take advantage of them.

Those interactions will cause

problems and set constraints, so clever politicians, uniformed or not,

will keep an eye on those links and will select those with the highest
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benefit-cost ratios, at least to themselves.

But even in a small country

the foreign sector will influence only indirectly

many

key developmental

variables, such as productivity in non-export agriculture, willingness
to save and decisions to invest in human capital.

Incane distribution

and political participation will be roore influenced by these and other
domestic variables than by whether effective rates of protection are
10 or 150 percent.
The

need for care in the definition of econanic openness is

another 1mportant point emerging from this essay, even if no definitive
fonnula has emerged.

(Others will have to dwell on definitions of

authoritarianism and liberty.)

'Ille literature is full of judP:,:nental

labels, such as "outward-oriented" and "inward-oriented" ee;onanies.
'!he matter is not an easy one, even if one focuses just on international

trade in goods and services.

'Ille problem lies in separating the

effect on observed trade of policy measures

from those generated by

the natural endoWIIEnt, population and per capita income of a country.

'.

Exam:1.ning

the balance between policy i..11centives for exporting versus
·-.

import substitution is one approach, but it should be noted that such a
balance may exist both at zero (or negative) incentives for both, or
at high levels of incentives for both.

Other policy variables which

could be mentioned only briefly in this essay, such as the exchange
rate and credit, are of critical importance in detenning the size
of the sector producing internationally traded goods and services.
Clearly trade may occur under a variety of institutional arrangements:
Chile, Hungary, Japan, South Korea, and Yugoslavia may be said to
be economies fairly opened to trade, yet their policy instruments are
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far from identical .

'Ihe nature of those instrumen ts and institutio ns

are irrportant for determini ng the effect of openness to trade on other
domestic variables , whether economic or political .

Openness was once

closely linked with policies of laissez faire, laissez passer, but
such an associati on is no longer valid.
'Ihe workings of an econonzy, whether open or closed, imposes con
straints on what political actors do.

Is the open econany oore of

a "delicate watch" than a closed econonzy? The point is debatable .
Insofar as certain types of openness increase the internati onal oobility
of some economic actors, such as financial capital and skilled labour,

it at.lg10ents their bargainin g power vis-a-vis the less mobile factors
(those whose wealth is tied
to go).

U'1

in land and unskilled labour with nowhere

Yet openness may also increase the flexibili ty of a political

leader bent on neglectin g one productiv e sector to benefit others; if
you can inport grains, you can neglect food productio n as long as you
have sanething to export in exchange or somebody lends you rnney.
However, on balance, it seems plausible that specialis ation tends to
increase vulnerab ility, and that the lower the internati onal mobility
of an economic agent, the greater its vulnerab ility will be.

Trade

unions of unskilled workers in activitie s producing exportabl e goods,
whether in Sweden, Japan or Colombia, will have limits set on their
wage aspiratio ns by internati onal condition s, yet their real incomes
and welfare may be higher than under a closed econany perhaps giving
them job security but neither gains from trade nor greater personal
liberty.

Note also that any economy,whether open or closed, aiming

at high rates of capital formation or defense expenditu res, will have
to limit consumption and real wages.

Closedness did not generate
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much growth 1n real wages 1n the Soviet Union of the 1930s nor the
Spain of-the 1940s, while South Korean real wages appear to have
risen faster than those of

Burma

during the last twenty years.

Exar.:ples of trade-offs bet\':een gains from trade and security are
easily multiplied:

oil importers prefer to trade with suppliers who

cannot always guarantee deliveries to being self-sufficien t 1n energy
when only charcoal is available at home, Additional constra1nts imposed
by o~n'1ess can also be illustrated by 1ntemational f1nancial flows:
clearly a cotmtry borro~ today commits itself to earn or save enough
:foreign exchange tomorrow to service the debt.

'lhis cormionsensical

reality may lead a country to conclude, like Polonius, that it is best
to "neither lender nor borrower be," but other nations with attractive
investment projects will think otherwise.
Openness will set limits particularly on political actors seeking
drastic and rapid transfonna.tions 1n their societies.

Freedom to

migrate presents obvious headaches; capital mobility may or may not
work 1n their favour; trade 1n goods and services provides dangerous
conduits to the enemy during revolutionary times.

~volutionarie s,

whether fascists, religious fundamentalists or leftists, will usually
favor sharp degrees of del:1.nking to establish their power and achieve

a radical transfonna.tion 1n the econorey and the polity.

Cnce finnly

in control, openings may follow.
'!he tmtangling of the econor.rl.c and political consequences of a

certain degree of openness maintained over many years from the effects

of a transition toward (or away) from that degree of openness is one
of the most difficult questions raised by this essay.

Recorded Latin

American economic history may be viewed as the result of long tenn
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forces disturbed by frequent external shocks and often erratic changes
in domestic policies; allocating observed events to each of these
causes is not a simple task.

As noted in the review of what main-

stream economics does and does not s;zy regarding openness, there is
a notorious lack of integration between the pure theory of international
--

trade, which addresses long-run questions using the method of comparative statics (or corrparative dynamics), and the theory of Balance
of-Payments adjustment mechanisms, which addresses short-run macro
economic questions, sharing; with modern macroeconomics a good deal
of controversy and confusion.

The study of Latin American openings

and closings requires that attention be paid both to short- and long

nm considerations, and seldom will both bring unambiguous gains or
losses.

In an important paper John Sheahan has argued that at the start
of the 1960s economic distortions of all sorts had accumulated to such

a point in many La.tin .American countries that repression appeared to
\
'

be, falsely but understandably, the necessary condition of economic
18/
policy.- The poor econor:rl.c performance generated by the distortions,
including those in the area of foreign trade, undermined support for
open governments; those governments, Sheahan argues, which gave great
enphasis to efficiency criteria were placed by the distorted structure
of the econorey in automatic alliance with the wealthy minority against

organised urban labour.
Sheahan's article emphasises how transition problems

may

create a

demand for authoritarian regimes; his article also covers broader
economic policies, going beyond those related to the external sector,
underlining the corr;:ilexity of the transition process.
JTt{

Nevertheless,

conjecture is that the demand for authoritarian reip.mes in the
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Southern Cone of La.tin America mainly came not from poor long-run
econanic performance, but more imnedia tely from unhinged macro
economic conditio ns, includin g three-d igit inflatio n and unsusta inable
balance-of-payments deficits .

The chaotic climate created by those

short-te nn circums tances opened the wa:y for the men in unifonn .
Did the poor long-ter m economic performance induced by sluggish
exports lead to short-te nn macroeconomic disorde r in the Southern
Cone? Perhaps.

Mediocre growth, under the 1960s politic al circum

stances of La.tin America (includi ng the then-sh ining example of the
Cuban Revolution) increase d the appeal of clashing authori tarian
fonnula s, first from the left and then

:f'rom

the right, premisin g to

break out of perceive d economic and social miasmas, at the .?xpense
of previous democratic achievements.

Populis t regimes first rode the

crest of demands for refonn, but lost control of ni.acroeconornic conditio ns
unleashi ng h,yperin flations and balance- of-paym ents crises.
But poor long-ter m performance need not have led inevitab ly to
chaotic populism nor to murderous authorit arianism .
experim::nt:

Consider a mental

suppose a country had very stiff import restrict ions,

sluggish export growth and tight controls over capital flows, but
1nnatio n remained in single digits, the balance- of-paym ents was
problem atical but under control , and there was low but reasona bly
steady growth.

Under these circumstances it is difficu lt to imagine

an abrupt authori tarian offensiv e to elimina te market distorti ons.

And

if it came about, the recessio ns, unemployment and real wage cuts
associat ed ~Tith Souther n Cone stabilis ation plans would be much less
likely to happen.

The mental experiment has a fairly close real-wo rld
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counterpart:

to the exasperation of nearly all types of economists,

for roore.than thirty years India has combined a rrECliocre economic
perfonnance with reasonably deroocratic political institutions.
Why Southern Cone authoritarian regimes chose certain economic

policies, and why peculiar alliances were forged between rational
economic technocrats and leading generals is a fascinating topic
(not unlike the Speer-Hitler connection), but one from which few
generalisations may be drawn, at least for the openness-authoritarian ism
link.

The need to check hyperinflation anci quickly correct balance

of-payments deficits is one which naturally brings together those used
to discipline, corranand, and punish with those emphasising order and
soundness in budgetary and rnc"'letary policies, at least re~arding civilian
expenditures and credit. Anti-inflationary measures do require a degree
of persistence that make authoritarian politics appealing to some
economists (and businessmen).

The need to check hyperinflation may

then provide a convenient cover to liquidate trade unions and political
enemies.

But note that even within the Southern Cone the degree to

which authoritarian regimes have roved toward free trade and free
capital m:::>venEnts is far from uniform.

As during the 1950s, some

observers tend to generalize from the Chilean case to all of Latin
America.

Chilean tariff books in 1981 paradoxically looked roore like

those of Switzerland than those of Argentina, Brazil or Uruguay.
It is tim: to close this essay by looking at the future.

What

was done in the Southern Cone during the 1970s was badly.and brutally
done.

But it does not follow that those who will come after the

authoritarians should undo everything which was done.

The advantages

of dynamic export growth was a lesson learned before Mr. Pinochet
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became notoriou s, and should survive him.

It would be foolish to rule

out the use of exchange controls because th~y were used by Hitler;
it would be silly to oppose lower tariffs because Pinoche t liked them.
But what if the 1980s turn out to be rrore like the 1930s than
like the 1960s as far as externa l demand for exports? 'lhat possi
bility, although unlikely , cannot be ruled out.

Private entrepre neurs

deciding whether to produce for the foreign or the domestic markets
are aware of these uncerta inties, and it is debatab le whether public
policy should push them very far one way or another .

The public sector

1n m:>st countrie s still faces many spending and investm ent decision s

for which expecta tions regardin g the buoyancy and openness of externa l
markets are ~ortan t.

It would be premature to adopt an expecta tion

of externa l catastro phe in these decisio ns.

While selling aoroad during

the 1980s may not be as easy as implied by the comfortable small
country asslJnl)tion, the likely effort appears to be worth a try 1n many
activiti es.

A country like Japan plans its exports cane what may;

circums tances may force changes in product s and markets , but the
decision to rna.1ntain a brisk export expansion is unquest ioned.

Whether

because the need for irreplac eable imports , such as oil, or because
of coornitments to service their debt (so long as there are no major

changes in the working of interna tional capital markets ), or because
of plausib le opportu nity cost calcula tions, Latin American countri es

may be wise to follow the Japanese example.

If such an openness strategy

1s followed for trade, a m::>re active particip ation in interna tional rules
would be desirab le. But that is another rna.tter. 191
S1rnilar conside rations apply to interact ions with interna tional capital markets .

I
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'Ihe favourabl e condition s which existed for sane borrowers during the
1970s, such as plentiful credit at negative real interest rates, are
tmlikely to exist in the 1980s. Just as Brazil exhausted opportun ities
for easy inport substitut ion in the 1930s and 1940s, it exhausted its
easy borrowing phase 1n the 1970s.

Yet the option to borrow abroad,

for Brazil and the rest of La.tin America, is likely to remain during
the 1980s a profitabl e one for the ~areful investor and a dangerous
one for the spendthr ift.
One may note that Southern delinkers have become 11objective alliesu
of Northern protectio nists who cloud the LDC outlook for the 1980s.
Many

a :-Jorthern observer expresses concern about Southern despotism

only after his or her profits or wages have been hanned by '3razilian
or South Korean exports (if the exports were Indian, old concerns about
the roorality of neutralism may be voiced instead).

Th~ old "pauper

labourn argurrent for protectio n has become the urepresse d labouru argument
for higher tariffs.

The development strategie s of Albania, Burma,

and Kan:puchea have a powerful appeal to Northern capitalis ts and workers
battling competiti on from Colombia and Taiwan.

It is not so surprisin g

then, that Business Week shoud refer to Samir Amin as one of the Third
World's best economists and expound his views. 201 South-South trade and
a basic-nee ds development strategy are also viewed with favor by
Northern protectio nists.

many

One cannot easily reconcile criticism s of

Northern protectio nism as unfair to the LDCs with proposals for Southern
delinking .

Some Northern academics, especiall y in

Europe, who regard

themselves as progressi ves and friends of the LDCs appear to take the
paternal istic view that if LDCs do not delink on their own, Northern pro
gressives (those academics and their trade union allies) will do it for

44
them, by erecting import controls.
In Spite of the troubled and uncertain outlook, the 1980s could

witness La.tin American economies which are open to trade and finance,
in a selective fashion not unlike that of smaller European countries

(such as Denmark, Finland or Hungary), while La.tin American polities
either ererge from the nig.~tmares of the 1970s or deepen their earlier
dem::>cratic achievements.

Surely the message of this essay is that

there is nothing unscientifi c 1n such a vision.
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~

title of this paper was snitched from Ronald Findlay, to

whom I am also grateful for stimulating discussions.

Gabriel Palma,

Diana 'fussie and other participants at the Millenium conference of

the London School of Econanics m April-May 1981 were also generous
with corrr.Ents and advice.

Im earlier draft benefitted from criticisms

from Marcelo Cavarozzi, Jonathan Eaton, Albert Fishlow, Albert Hirschman,

wuka Y.atseli, and John Sheahan. The usual caveats apply.

1/ 'Ihis distinction was presented m F.dmar Bacha and Carlos

F. Diaz-Alejandro, "Financial markets: A view from the semi-periphery",
a paper part of a project on External Fmancial Relations arid their
Impact on the La.tinamerican Economies, carried on under the coordination
of CIEPLAN and the support of the Ford Foundation.
2/

Gottfried Haberler, "Postcript", mR.C. Amacher, G. Haberler,

and T.D. Willett (eds.), Challenges To a Liberal International Economic
Order (Washington, D.C. : American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1979) p.87.

The remarks by Ronald Fmdlay are m this volume,

pp. 73-80.
3/

See

Paul R• .Kn@nan, "A rood.el of innovation, technology transfer

and the world distribution of mcome" Journal of Political Economy
(Voltmle 87, Number 2, April 1979) pp. 253-266.

See also "U.S. Blunts

Japan's Technology Quest" m The Wall Street Journal, September 8, 1981,
p.39 reporting that there is widespread fear am:,ng U.S. manufacturers
that selling technology to the Japanese will boomerang.
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I am drawing here on my "Delinkinr; North and South: Unshackled

or Unhinged?", in Albert Fishlow, et al, Rich and Poor Nations in the
World Economy (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1978) pp. 87-162,
and on the works cited there, especially that of W.N. Corden.

For a

review of the post-war literature the interested reader may consult my
"'Ira.de policies and economic development", in Peter B. Kenen (ed.),
International Trade and Finance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1975) pp. 93-150.
2_/ . See Avinash Dixit, "The export of capital theo!"J'', Journal of
International Economics (Volume 11, No.2, May 1981) pp. 279-294.
"'Ihe general result on gains from trade shows that, given the
necessary redistributive tools, an autarkic economy should
roove to free trade, and 3. free-trading economy should not
roove to autarky. This is so iITespective of the comparison
of the two steady-state consumption levels. Economies in the
real world are clearly constrained by their historically
deternrlned initial conditions. The kind of arrl.storic com
parison made in the Golden Rule result, or the result of
Steedman et al, is clearly of no practical relevance for
accurrn.llationor trade policy" p. 288.

§I See Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro , "The Less-Developed Countries
and Transnational Enterprises", in Sven Grassman and Erik Lundberg,
'Ihe Worl.d Economic Order:
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(London:

The Macmillan

Press, Ltd., 1981) pp. 233-256. For a discussion regarding corporations
and derrocratic theory see Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets:
'!he World's Political-Econo mic Systems (New York:
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pp.5 and 356.
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For roore discussion on the m:xiest question:

Why not seek world

efficiency via labour roovements instead of capital movements?, see my
"North-South relations:

the econanic component", International Organization

(Volume 29, Number 1, Winter 1975) pp. 218-221.
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Gottfried Ha.berler, "Postcript",

~

Haberler·has been consistent on this point.

cit, p.86.

Professor

In 1943 he argued:

"In fact,.the obstacles to free or freer migration are so
fonnidable, so much greater than those to free or freer
trade, that it may well be argued that the question should
be dropped altogether or at least not linked with the question
of freeing the rrovement of goods in order not to jeopardise
the chances of achieving something in the trade field"
In a footnote to this sentence he added:

"Just think of the chances of persuading the people of the
United States, Australia, or any other country with a high
standard of living to pennit the free imnigration of Chinese
(not to speak of Japanese) labour after the war! Also, from
a selfish point of view of the country or of large groups
(e.g.,labour) in the country into which inmigration is to
take place, much more serious objections can be raised against
free :iJTinigration than against the free importation of goods".
See Gottfried Haberler, "The Political Economy of Regional or
Continental Blocs", in Seyrrour E. Harris (ed), Postwar Economic Problems
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1943). pp.326-327.
9/ 'lhis observation is based on the reactions of students to
-a course taught jointly by Hugh Patrick and myself at Yale University

on the Economic History of Follower Countries.

The students have

often rena.rked on the manner in which the Latin American section of
the course spends much m:::>re time dealing with the external sector than
does the Japanese half of the course; though, of course, this may be
due to the idiosyncracies of the teachers involved.
10/ For an overview of Samir Arnin's and other similar a.rgLm1.ents
extolling the virtues of withdrawal or "delinking"

from the international

econon:w, see Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, "Delinldng North and South:
Unshackled or Unhinged?"

~
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12/ For~ interpretation of these events see "Iatin America in
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1980 and April 1981, respectively.
13/ See his brilliant "The turn to authoritarianism in La.tin
America and the search for its economic determinants", in David Collier

(ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Iatin Ar.Jerica (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979) pp. 61-98. The letter from Peron to Ibanez
appears in p.65.
14/ See United Nations Economic Conmission for La.tin /merica,
Economic Survey of Iatin America 1951-1952 (United Nations document
F/CN.12/291/Rev.l, 28 March 1953) p.xxii.
15/ See Michael Michaely, "Exports and growth: .An empirical
investigation", Journal of Development Economics (Volume 4, No. 1,
March 1977) pp. 49-54; and Michael Michaely, "Export and growth: A
reply", Journal of Develonment Economics (Volume 6,-No.l,March 1979)
pp.141-143.
16/ See the essay by S. Griffith-Jones in this volume, and
also E. Bacha and C.F. Diaz-Alejandro, 2E. cit, for a mre detailed
discussion of the interactions of La.tin American countries with inter
national capital markets.
17/ See John F.O. Bilson, "Civil Liberty-An Econometric
Investigation", Kyklos (forthcoming, January 1982). Bilson also
concludes:

f

" •••there is no clear evidence that a gradual rove towards
greater government intervention in a democratic state will
be associated with a decline in civil liberty. There is,
however, a clear and predictable correlation between the
concentration in the political system arid the extent of
personal freedom. In other words, if an individual is
told that a country is capitalist this information is not
very informative with regard to the extent of civil liberty
in that country. On the other hand, if the individual is
told that the country has a multi-party political system,
this information is valuable".
18/ See John Sheahan, "Market-oriented Economic Policies
and Political Repression in La.tin .America", Econanic Development.
and Cultural Change (Volume 28, No. 2, January 1980) pp. 267-291.
19/ That matter is discussed in my "La.tin .America and the
World Economy in the 1980s", Econanic Forum, Vol.Xl, No. 2,
Winter 1980-Sl, pp.38-53,

For interesting proposals for refornrl.ng

major international organisations see Miriam Camps and Catherine
Gwin, Collective Management; The Reform of Global Economic Orr.r,anisations
(New York:

McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981) • Hungary and Pola."1d

_applied during 1981 for admission to the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank; China joined those organisations earlier.

It

remains to be seen whether a similar trend toward globalisation will

also occur in GATI'.
20/ See Business Week, November 9, 1981, p,29.

Not all Northern

capitalists, of course, will fear Southern export expansion.

In

tenns of international trade m:xiels, attitudes will depend on the
degree of m::,bility, domestic and international, of the different
factors of production.

